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Recently, the physically realistic protocol amplifying the randomness of Santha-Vazirani sources
producing cryptographically secure random bits was proposed; however for reasons of practical rele-
vance, the crucial question remained open whether this can be accomplished under the minimal con-
ditions necessary for the task. Namely, is it possible to achieve randomness amplification using only
two no-signaling components and in a situation where the violation of a Bell inequality only guar-
antees that some outcomes of the device for specific inputs exhibit randomness? Here, we solve this
question and present a device-independent protocol for randomness amplification of Santha-Vazirani
sources using a device consisting of two non-signaling components. We show that the protocol can
amplify any such source that is not fully deterministic into a fully random source while tolerating a
constant noise rate and prove the composable security of the protocol against general no-signaling
adversaries. Our main innovation is the proof that even the partial randomness certified by the two-
party Bell test (a single input-output pair (u∗, x∗) for which the conditional probability P (x∗|u∗) is
bounded away from 1 for all no-signaling strategies that optimally violate the Bell inequality) can be
used for amplification. We introduce the methodology of a partial tomographic procedure on the em-
pirical statistics obtained in the Bell test that ensures that the outputs constitute a linear min-entropy
source of randomness. As a technical novelty that may be of independent interest, we prove that the
Santha-Vazirani source satisfies an exponential concentration property given by a recently discovered
generalized Chernoff bound.
Introduction.- Random number generators are ubiqui-
tous, finding applications in varied domains such as sta-
tistical sampling, computer simulations and gambling
scenarios. Certain physical phenomena such as radioac-
tive decay or thermal radiation have high natural en-
tropy, there are also computational algorithms that pro-
duce sequences of apparently random bits. In many
cryptographic tasks however, it is necessary to have
trustworthy sources of randomness. As such, devel-
oping device-independent protocols for generating ran-
dom bits is of paramount importance.
We consider the task of randomness amplification, to
convert a source of partially random bits to one of fully
random bits. The paradigmatic model of a source of ran-
domness is the Santha-Vazirani (SV) source [1], a model
of a biased coin where the individual coin tosses are
not independent but rather the bits Yi produced by the
source obey
1
2
− ε ≤ P (Yi = 0|Yi−1, . . . , Y1) ≤ 1
2
+ ε. (1)
Here 0 ≤ ε < 12 is a parameter describing the reliability
of the source, the task being to convert a source with
ε < 12 into one with ε → 0. Interestingly, this task is
known to be impossible with classical resources, a single
SV source cannot be amplified [1].
In [2], the non-local correlations of quantum mechan-
ics were shown to provide an advantage in the task of
amplifying an SV source. A device-independent proto-
col for generating truly random bits was demonstrated
starting from a critical value of ε(≈ 0.06) [2, 3], where
device-independence refers to the fact that one need
not trust the internal workings of the device. An im-
provement was made in [4] where using an arbitrar-
ily large number of spatially separated devices, it was
shown that one could amplify randomness starting from
any initial ε < 12 . In [1], we demonstrated a device-
independent protocol which uses a constant number of
spatially separated components and amplifies sources of
arbitrary initial ε < 12 while simultaneously tolerating
a constant amount of noise in its implementation. All
of these protocols were shown to be secure against gen-
eral adversaries restricted only by the no-signaling prin-
ciple of relativity under a technical assumption of inde-
pendence between the source and the device. In [6], a
randomness amplification protocol was formulated for
general min-entropy sources and shown to be secure
against quantum adversaries without the independence
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2assumption, the drawback of this protocol being that it
requires a device with a large number of spatially sep-
arated components for its implementation. Other pro-
tocols have also been proposed [7, 8], for which full se-
curity proofs are missing. For fundamental as well as
practical reasons, it is vitally important to minimize the
number of spatially separated components in the pro-
tocol. As such, devising a protocol with the minimum
possible number of components (two space-like sepa-
rated ones for a protocol based on a Bell test) while at
the same time, allowing for robustness to errors in its
implementation is crucial.
Let U,X denote the input and output sets respectively,
of honest parties in a device-independent Bell-based
protocol for randomness amplification. A necessary
condition for obtaining randomness against general no-
signaling (NS) attacks is that for some input u∗ ∈ U,
output x∗ ∈ X and a constant c < 1, every no-signaling
box {P (x|u)} that obtains the observed Bell violation has
P (x = x∗|u = u∗) ≤ c. i.e.,
∃(x∗,u∗) s.t. ∀{P (x|u)} with B · {P (x|u)} = 0
P (x = x∗|u = u∗) ≤ c < 1, (2)
where B is an indicator vector (with entries B(x,u))
encoding the Bell expression and B · {P (x|u)} =∑
x,u B(x,u)P (x|u) = 0 denotes that the box {P (x|u)}
algebraically violates the inequality. Note that while
the Bell inequality violation guarantees Eq.(2) for some
x∗,u∗ for each NS box, here the requirement is for a
strictly bounded common entry P (x = x∗|u = u∗) for
all boxes leading to the observed Bell violation. It is
straightforward to see that if Eq. (2) is not met, then
the observed Bell violation does not guarantee any ran-
domness and a device-independent protocol to obtain
randomness cannot be built on the basis of this viola-
tion. If in addition to the necessary condition in Eq. (2),
we also had for the same input-output pair (u∗, x∗) that
c˜ ≤ P (x = x∗|u = u∗) (3)
for some constant c˜ > 0, then clearly all the outputs for
input u∗ possess randomness and extraction of this ran-
domness may be feasible.
Here, we present a fully device-independent proto-
col that allows to amplify the randomness of any ε-
SV source under the minimal necessary condition in
Eq. (2). A novel element of the protocol is an ad-
ditional test (to the usual Bell test) akin to partial to-
mography of the boxes that the honest parties perform,
to lower bound (in a linear number of runs) P (x =
x∗|u = u∗) =: D · {P (x|u)}. Here D is an indica-
tor vector with entries D(x,u) such that D(x,u) = 1
iff (x,u) = (x∗,u∗). This test ensures that additionally
Eq.(3) is also met for a sufficient number of runs, a de-
tailed description is provided in the Supplemental Ma-
terial. The protocol uses a device consisting of only two
Protocol I
1. The ε-SV source is used to choose the measurement set-
tings u = (u1≤n,u
2
≤n) for n runs on the single device con-
sisting of two components. The device produces output
bits x = (x1≤n, x
2
≤n).
2. The parties perform an estimation of the violation of the
Bell inequality in the device by computing the empirical
average Ln(x, u) := 1n
∑n
i=1B(xi,ui). The protocol is
aborted unless Ln(x, u) ≤ δ for fixed constant δ > 0.
3. Conditioned on not aborting in the previ-
ous step, the parties subsequently check if
Sn(x, u) := 1n
∑n
i=1D(xi,ui) ≥ µ1. The protocol
is aborted if this condition is not met for fixed µ1 > 0.
4. Conditioned on not aborting in the previous steps, the
parties apply an independent source extractor [4, 6] to
the sequence of outputs from the device and further n
bits from the SV source.
FIG. 1: Protocol for device-independent randomness amplifi-
cation from a single device with two no-signaling components.
no-signaling components and tolerates a constant error
rate. We show that the output bits from the protocol sat-
isfy universally-composable security, the strongest form
of cryptographic security, for any adversary limited only
by the no-signaling principle.
Main Result.- We present a two-party protocol to am-
plify the randomness of SV sources against no-signaling
adversaries, formally we show the following (the de-
tailed security proof is presented in the Supplemental
Material):
Theorem 1 (informal). For every ε < 12 , there is a proto-
col using an ε-SV source and a device consisting of two no-
signaling components with the following properties:
• Using the device poly(n, log(1/γ)) times, the protocol
either aborts or produces n bits which are γ-close to uni-
form and independent of any no-signaling side infor-
mation about the device and classical side information
about the source (e.g. held by an adversary).
• Local measurements on many copies of a two-party en-
tangled state, with poly(1−2ε) error rate, give rise to a
device that does not abort the protocol with probability
larger than 1− 2−Ω(n).
The protocol is non-explicit and runs in poly(n, log (1/γ))
time. Alternatively it can use an explicit extractor to pro-
duce a single bit of randomness that is γ-close to uniform in
poly(log (1/γ)) time.
Protocol.- The protocol for the task of randomness am-
plification from ε-SV sources is given explicitly in Fig. 1
and illustrated in Fig. 2, its structure is as follows. The
two honest parties Alice and Bob use bits from the ε-SV
source to choose the inputs to their no-signaling boxes
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FIG. 2: An illustration of the protocol for randomness ampli-
fication using two no-signaling components. The bits from the
SV source (black arrows) are used as inputs (u1j ,u
2
j ) for the j-
th run of the two spatially separated devices, with 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
and the corresponding outputs (x1j ,x
2
j ) are obtained. The in-
puts and outputs of all the n runs (u, x) are subjected to two
tests: a Bell test for the violation of a specific Bell inequality
and a (partial) tomographic test counting a specific number of
input-output pairs (u∗,x∗). If both tests are passed (denoted
by ACC), the outputs x (orange arrows) are hashed together
with further n bits t from the SV source using an extractor.
in multiple runs of a Bell test and obtain their respective
outputs. They check for the violation of a Bell inequal-
ity and abort the protocol if the test condition is not met.
The novel part of the protocol is a subsequent test that
the honest parties perform which ensures when passed
that a sufficient number of runs were performed with
boxes that have randomness in their outputs. If both
tests are passed, the parties apply a randomness extrac-
tor to the output bits and some further bits taken from
the SV source. The output bits of the extractor consti-
tute the output of the protocol, which we show to be
close to being fully random and uncorrelated from any
no-signaling adversary.
Description of the setup.- The setup of the protocol is as
follows. The honest parties and Eve share a no-signaling
box {p(x, z|u′, w)}where u′ = u’≤n := (u’1, . . . ,u’n) and
x = x≤n := (x1, . . . , xn) denote the input and output, re-
spectively, of the honest parties for the n runs of the pro-
tocol, with w and z being the inputs and outputs of the
adversary Eve. The devices held by the honest parties
are separated into 2 components with corresponding in-
puts and outputs u′i and xi, respectively, for i = 1, 2, i.e.,
u′ = (u′1, u′2) and x = (x1, x2). Note that u′i, xi them-
selves denote the inputs and outputs of the n runs of
the protocol for party i, i.e., u′i = u’i≤n := (u’
i
1, . . . ,u’
i
n)
and xi = xi≤n = (x
i
1, . . . , xin). Here, for the j-th run of
the Bell test, we have labeled the measurement settings
of Alice u’1j and those of Bob u’
2
j with the correspond-
ing outcomes x1j and x
2
j , and denoted the joint inputs of
Alice and Bob in this run as u’j = (u’1j ,u’
2
j ) with corre-
sponding joint output xj = (x1j , x
2
j ). The honest parties
draw bits u from the SV source to input into the box,
i.e., they set u′ = u. They also draw further n bits t,
which will be fed along with the outputs x into the ran-
domness extractor to obtain the output of the protocol
s := Ext(x, t). The adversary has classical information e
correlated to u, t. The box we consider for the protocol is
therefore given by the family of probability distributions
{p(x, z, u, t, e|u′, w)}.
Assumptions.- Let us first state formally the assump-
tions on {p(x, z, u, t, e|u′, w)}, see also [1].
• No-signaling (shielding) assumption: The box
satisfies the constraint of no-signaling between the
honest parties and Eve as well as between the dif-
ferent components of the device
p(x|u′, w) = p(x|u′),
p(z|u′, w) = p(z|w),
p(xi|u′) = p(xi|u′i) i = 1, 2. (4)
Each device component also obeys a time-ordered
no-signaling (tons) condition for the k ∈ [n] runs
performed on it:
p(xik|z, u′i, w, u, t, e) =
p(xik|z, u′i≤k, w, u, t, e) ∀k ∈ [n] (5)
where u′i≤k := u
′i
1 , . . . , u
′i
k .
• SV conditions: The variables (u, t, e) form an SV
source, that is satisfy Eq. (1). In particular, p(t|u, e)
and p(u|e) also obey the SV source conditions. The
fact that e cannot be perfectly correlated to u, t is
called the private SV source assumption [1].
• Assumption A1: The devices do not signal to the
SV source, i.e., the distribution of (u, t, e) is inde-
pendent of the inputs (u′, w):∑
x,z
p(x, z, u, t, e|u′, w) = p(u, t, e) ∀(u, t, e, u′, w).(6)
• Assumption A2: The box is fixed independently
of the SV source:
p(x, z|u′, w, u, t, e) = p(x, z|u′, w) ∀(x, z, u′, w, u, t, e).
(7)
In words, the main assumptions are that the different
components of the device do not signal to each other
4and to the adversary Eve. Additionally, there is also a
time-ordered no-signaling (tons) structure assumed on
different runs of a single component, the outputs in any
run may depend on the previous inputs within the com-
ponent but not on future inputs. Moreover, we also as-
sume that the structure of the box p(x, z|u′, w) is fixed
independently of the SV source p(u, t, e), i.e., the box is
an unknown and arbitrary input-output channel inde-
pendent of the SV source. This precludes malicious cor-
relations such as in the scenario where for each bit string
u taken from the source, a different (possibly local) box
tuned to u is supplied, in which case the Bell test may be
faked by local boxes [17]. Finally, it is worth noting that
no randomness may be extracted under the assumptions
stated above in a classical setting, whereas the Bell vio-
lation by quantum boxes allows to amplify randomness
in a device-independent setting.
Security definition.- For Ln(x, u) = 1n
∑n
i=1B(xi,ui),
the first (Bell) test in the protocol is passed when
Ln(x, u) ≤ δ. We define the set ACC1 as the set of (x, u)
such that this test is passed:
ACC1 := {(x, u) : Ln(x, u) ≤ δ}. (8)
The δ is the noise parameter in the Bell test which is cho-
sen to be a positive constant depending on the initial ε
of the SV source, going to zero in the limit of ε→ 12 (see
Theorem 8 in the Supplemental Material). Similarly, we
define ACC2 as the set of (x, u) for which the second test
is passed, i.e.,
ACC2 := {(x, u) : Sn(x, u) ≥ µ1} . (9)
We also define the set ACC = ACC1∩ACC2 of (x, u) for
which both tests in the protocol are passed and ACCu as
the cut
ACCu := {x : (x, u) ∈ ACC}. (10)
After u is input as u′ and conditioned on the accep-
tance of the tests ACC, applying the independent source
extractor [4–6] s = Ext(x, t), one gets the box
p(s, z, e|w,ACC)
≡
∑
u
∑
Ext(x,t)=s
p(x, z, u, t, e|w,ACC). (11)
The composable security criterion is now defined in
terms of the distance of p(s, z, e|w,ACC) to an ideal
box pid = 1|S|p(z, e|w,ACC) with p(z, e|w,ACC) =∑
s p(s, z, e|w,ACC). Formally, the security is given by
the distance dc defined as
dc :=
∑
s,e
max
w
∑
z
∣∣∣∣p(s, z, e|w,ACC)− 1|S|p(z, e|w,ACC)
∣∣∣∣ .
(12)
Outline of the proof.- The proof of security of the pro-
tocol is a modification of the proof we presented in
[1] with the crucial differences being due to the weak
randomness that the two-party Bell inequality violation
gives and an additional partial tomographic test im-
posed on the device.
To amplify SV sources, one needs Bell inequalities
where quantum theory can achieve the maximal no-
signaling value of the inequality [2], failing which, for
sufficiently small ε, the observed correlations may be
faked with classical deterministic boxes. However, Bell
inequalities with this property are not sufficient, this is
exemplified by the tripartite Mermin inequality [2, 14].
This inequality is algebraically violated in quantum the-
ory using a GHZ state, however for any function of the
measurement outcomes one can find no-signaling boxes
which achieve its maximum violation and for which this
particular function is deterministic thereby providing an
attack for Eve to predict with certainty the final out-
put bit. While [4] and [1] considered Bell inequalities
with more parties, the problem of finding two-party al-
gebraically violated Bell inequalities (known as pseudo-
telepathy games) [13] with the property of randomness
for some function of the measurement outcomes was
open. Unfortunately, none of the bipartite Bell inequali-
ties tested so far have the property that all no-signaling
boxes which maximally violate the inequality have ran-
domness in any function of the measurement outcomes
f(x) for some input u in the sense that for all such boxes
1
2
− κ ≤ p(f(x)|u) ≤ 1
2
+ κ (13)
for some 0 < κ < 12 . We say that Bell inequalities with
property (13) guarantee strong randomness.
The Bell inequality we consider for the task of
randomness amplification is a modified version of a
Kochen-Specker game from [2]. The inequality involves
two parties Alice and Bob, each making one of nine
possible measurements and obtaining one of four pos-
sible outcomes, which is explained further in the Sup-
plemental Material. Even though it does not guarantee
the strong randomness in Eq.(13) for any function of the
measurement outcomes f(x) for any input u, it has the
redeeming feature of guaranteeing weak randomness in
the following sense. For all no-signaling boxes which
algebraically violate the inequality, there exists one mea-
surement setting u∗ and one outcome x∗ for this setting
such that
0 ≤ p(x = x∗|u = u∗) ≤ γ
∀{p(x|u)} s.t B · {p(x|u)} = 0 (14)
for some 0 < γ < 1. The above fact is checked by linear
programming and is shown in Lemma 1 in the Supple-
mental Material.
The novel technique in the form of a partial tomo-
graphic test, subsequent to the Bell test, allows us to ex-
tract randomness in this minimal scenario of weak ran-
domness. This simply checks for the number of times a
5particular input-output pair (u∗, x∗) appears, the analy-
sis of this test is done by an application of the Azuma-
Hoeffding inequality. We show that the SV source obeys
a generalized Chernoff bound that ensures that with
high probability when the inputs are chosen with such
a source, the measurement setting u∗ appears in a lin-
ear fraction of the runs. Thus, conditioned on both
tests in the protocol being passed (which happens with
large probability with the use of the SV source and good
quantum boxes by the honest parties), we obtain that
with high probability over the input, the output is a
source of linear min-entropy.
This allows us to use known results on randomness
extractors for two independent sources of linear min-
entropy [4, 6], namely one given by the outputs of the
measurement and the other given by the SV source. As
shown in Proposition 16 of [1], one can use extractors
secure against classical side information even in the sce-
nario of general no-signaling adversaries by accepting a
loss in the rate of the protocol, i.e., increasing the output
error. The randomness extractor used in the protocol is
a non-explicit extractor from [4]. Alternatively, there is
an explicit extractor that can be employed in the proto-
col that has been found recently [6], but then it can pro-
duce just one bit of randomness. It also follows from [1]
that there exists a protocol to obtain more bits with an
explicit extractor using a device with three no-signaling
components by employing additionally a de-Finetti the-
orem for no-signaling devices [16] (see Protocol II in [1]).
Conclusion and Open Questions.- We presented a
device-independent protocol to amplify randomness in
the minimal conditions under which such a task is pos-
sible, and used it to obtain secure random bits from an
arbitrarily (but not fully) deterministic Santha-Vazirani
source. The protocol uses a device consisting of only
two non-signaling components, and works with cor-
relations attainable by noisy quantum mechanical re-
sources. Moreover, its correctness is not based on quan-
tum mechanics and only requires the no-signaling prin-
ciple.
Important open questions still remain. One interest-
ing question is whether the requirement of strict inde-
pendence between the SV source and the devices can be
relaxed to only require limited independence [17]. An-
other is to amplify the randomness of more general min-
entropy sources that do not possess the structure of the
Santha-Vazirani source. Finally, a significant open prob-
lem is to realize device-independent quantum key dis-
tribution with an imperfect source of randomness, toler-
ating a constant error rate and achieving a constant key
rate.
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Supplemental Material. Here, we give the for-
mal proof of composable security for the device-
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nents presented in the main text.
Let us recall that the SV source is defined by the con-
dition that bits Yi produced by the source obey
1
2
− ε ≤ P (Yi = 0|Yi−1, . . . , Y1) ≤ 1
2
+ ε (15)
for some 0 ≤ ε < 12 . Let us also recall the notation
from the main text. The honest parties and Eve share
a no-signaling box {p(x, z|u′, w)} where u′ = u’≤n :=
(u’1, . . . ,u’n) and x = x≤n = (x1, . . . , xn) denote the
input and output respectively of the honest parties for
the n runs of the protocol, with w and z the respective
inputs and outputs of the adversary Eve. The devices
held by the honest parties are separated into m = 2
components with corresponding inputs and outputs u′i
and xi respectively, for i = 1, 2, i.e., u′ = (u′1, u′2) and
x = (x1, x2). Here, u′i, xi themselves denote the inputs
and outputs of the n runs of the protocol for party i, i.e.,
u′i = u’i≤n and xi = xi≤n. Here, for the j-th run of the
Bell test, the inputs of Alice are u’1j and those of Bob
are u’2j with the corresponding outcomes x1j and x
2
j re-
spectively, and the joint inputs of Alice and Bob in this
run are u’j = (u’1j ,u’
2
j ) with corresponding joint outputs
xj = (x1j , x
2
j ). The honest parties draw bits u from the SV
source to input into the box, i.e., they set u′ = u, they
also draw a further n bits t which will be fed along with
the outputs x into the randomness extractor to obtain
the output of the protocol s := Ext(x, t). The adversary
has classical information e correlated to u, t. The box we
consider for the protocol is given by the family of prob-
ability distributions {p(x, z, u, t, e|u′, w)}
ASSUMPTIONS
The Assumptions under which the Protocol is proven
secure are formally stated in the main text. From As-
sumptions A1 and A2, as well as no-signaling
p(x|u′, w) = p(x|u′),
p(z|u′, w) = p(z|w),
p(xi|u′) = p(xi|u′i) i = 1, 2. (16)
and time-ordered-no-signaling assumptions,
p(xik|z, u′i, w, u, t, e) =
p(xik|z, u′i≤k, w, u, t, e) ∀k ∈ [n] (17)
we find that the distributions {pw(x, z, u, t, e)} satisfy
(see [1]):
pw(x, u) = p(x, u) (18)
pw(u, t, e) = p(u, t, e) (19)
∀w pw(x, z|u, t, e) = pw(x, z|u) (20)
∀w pw(x, z|u, t, e) = pw(x, z|u, e) (21)
pw(x|z, u, t, e) = pz,t,e,w(x|u) is time-ordered no-signaling
(22)
pw(u|z, e) , pw(t|z, u, e) are SV sources (23)
The composable security criterion is given in terms of
the distance dc defined as
dc :=
∑
s,e
max
w
∑
z
∣∣∣∣p(s, z, e|w,ACC)− 1|S|p(z, e|w,ACC)
∣∣∣∣ .
(24)
Let us define the quantity d′ as
d′ :=
∑
e
p(e|ACC) max
w
∑
z,u
p(z, u|e, w,ACC)×
∑
s
∣∣∣∣p(s|z, w, u, e,ACC)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣ (25)
for any family of probability distributions
{p(x, z, u, t, e|w)}. Now, for each e, let we and
pwe(x, z, u, t, e) denote the input of Eve and the
corresponding probability distribution respectively that
achieve the maximum d′ in Eq. (25). By Assumption
A1 and the no-signaling conditions, p(e|w) = p(e) and
p(x, u|w) = p(x, u) so that the maximum is achieved by
a distribution q(x, z, u, t, e) = p(e)pwe(x, z, u, t|e). We
can thus consider the quantity d = d′ given as
d =
∑
z,u,e
q(z, u, e|ACC)
∑
s
∣∣∣∣q(s|z, u, e,ACC)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣ .
(26)
As shown in [1], we have
dc ≤ |S|d. (27)
7From the assumptions stated, it is seen that q(x, u, z, t, e)
obeys
q(x, z|u, t, e) = q(x, z|u)
q(x|z, u, t, e) = qt,e,z(x|u) is time-ordered no-signaling
q(u|z, e) , q(t|z, u, e) obey the SV source conditions.
(28)
THE BELL INEQUALITY
The Bell inequality we consider for the task of ran-
domness amplification is a modified version of the bi-
partite inequality in [2]. The inequality belongs to the
class (2, 9, 4) signifying that it involves two parties Al-
ice and Bob, each making one of nine possible measure-
ments and obtaining one of four possible outcomes. We
label the measurement settings of Alice u1 and those of
Bob u2 with u1,u2 ∈ {1, . . . , 9}. The corresponding out-
comes of Alice are labeled x1 and those of Bob x2 with
x1, x2 ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. Note that from the notation in the
main text these inputs and outputs would correspond
to a particular run of the protocol uij , x
i
j . Acting on a
box {P (x|u)} with x = (x1, x2) and u = (u1,u2), the Bell
expression may be written as
B · {P (x|u)} =
∑
x,u
B(x,u)P (x|u) ≥ 4, (29)
Here B is an indicator vector with entries
B(x,u) =
{
1 : (x,u) ∈ SB
0 : otherwise (30)
The minimum value achieved by local realistic theo-
ries for this combination of probabilities is 4 while gen-
eral no-signaling theories can achieve the algebraic min-
imum value of 0. Crucially, there exist a quantum state
and suitable measurements reaching this algebraic min-
imum.
The set SB =
⋃
SuB for which B(x,u) = 1 is defined
using the orthogonality hypergraph in Fig. 3 which rep-
resents a Kochen-Specker set of vectors from [3] display-
ing state-independent contextuality in dimension 4. In
this graph, the nine measurements are represented by
the nine colored hyperedges each giving four outcomes,
where the vertices represent rank-one projectors corre-
sponding to the outcomes. Each party performs the nine
measurements corresponding to the KS set, the set SB
consists of all 81 pairs of measurements u. For each u,
the pair of outcomes x ∈ SuB if the vertex representing
outcome x1 in u1 is connected by a hyperedge to the
vertex representing outcome x2 in u2. A direct count-
ing shows that out of the 42 × 92 = 1296 probabilities
P (x|u), 504 enter the Bell expression. Moreover, in any
deterministic assignment of 1′s and 0′s to these prob-
abilities respecting the no-signaling and normalization
1
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III
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V
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IX
FIG. 3: Illustration of the Kochen-Specker set used in formu-
lating the bipartite Bell inequality
constraints, at least four probabilities are assigned value
1 giving rise to the local realistic bound. In quantum
theory and in general no-signaling theories however, all
504 probabilities may be set to 0 giving rise to the alge-
braic violation of the inequality.
In order to achieve the maximal violation within
quantum theory, Alice and Bob share a maximally en-
tangled state in dimension four, namely
|Ψ〉 = 1
2
4∑
i=1
|i〉 ⊗ |i〉. (31)
The measurements they each perform correspond ex-
actly to the 18 projectors defining the Kochen-Specker
set in [3]. Specifically, these projectors correspond to the
following vectors
|v1〉 = (1, 0, 0, 0)T |v2〉 = (0, 1, 0, 0)T |v3〉 = (0, 0, 1, 1)T |v4〉 = (0, 0, 1,−1)T
|v5〉 = (1,−1, 0, 0)T |v6〉 = (1, 1,−1,−1)T |v7〉 = (1, 1, 1, 1)T |v8〉 = (1,−1, 1,−1)T
|v9〉 = (1, 0,−1, 0)T |v10〉 = (0, 1, 0,−1)T |v11〉 = (1, 0, 1, 0)T |v12〉 = (1, 1,−1, 1)T
|v13〉 = (−1, 1, 1, 1)T |v14〉 = (1, 1, 1,−1)T |v15〉 = (1, 0, 0, 1)T |v16〉 = (0, 1,−1, 0)T
|v17〉 = (0, 1, 1, 0)T |v18〉 = (0, 0, 0, 1)T
(32)
8The nine measurements are defined by the following nine bases
M1 = (|v1〉, |v2〉, |v3〉, |v4〉) M2 = (|v4〉, |v5〉, |v6〉, |v7〉) M3 = (|v7〉, |v8〉, |v9〉, |v10〉)
M4 = (|v10〉, |v11〉, |v12〉, |v13〉) M5 = (|v13〉, |v14〉, |v15〉, |v16〉) M6 = (|v16〉, |v17〉, |v18〉, |v1〉)
M7 = (|v2〉, |v9〉, |v11〉, |v18〉) M8 = (|v3〉, |v5〉, |v12〉, |v14〉) M9 = (|v6〉, |v8〉, |v15〉, |v17〉)
(33)
For this state and measurements all the probabilities en-
tering the Bell expression are identically zero, so that al-
gebraic violation is achieved.
Apart from the fact that quantum mechanics violates
the inequality, we would also like to ensure that a strong
violation of the inequality guarantees randomness. Un-
fortunately, none of the bipartite Bell inequalities tested
so far have this property. The above inequality though
has the following redeeming feature. Let u∗ ≡ (1, 2) be a
particular pair of measurement settings and x∗ ≡ (1, 3)
a chosen pair of outcomes for this setting. For all no-
signaling boxes which algebraically violate the inequal-
ity, it holds that
0 ≤ P (x = x∗|u = u∗) ≤ 3
4
∀{P (x|u)} s.t B · {P (x|u)} = 0 (34)
It should be noted that for the quantum box which al-
gebraically violates the inequality defined by the above
state and measurements, we have Pq(x = x∗|u = u∗) =
1
16 so that upon maximal violation, we expect a fixed
number of outputs x∗ for inputs u∗ in the experiment.
Moreover, for boxes with a Bell value δ, we will see in
Lemma 2 that 0 ≤ P (x∗|u∗) ≤ 14 (3 + 2δ). So that, when
one has large violation of the inequality and a sufficient
number of outputs and inputs (x∗,u∗), it must be the
case that a sufficient number of runs in the experiment
were done with boxes that yield randomness.
(Partial)Randomness from an observed Bell value
Using the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality, we have that
if the observed Bell value is small, then a linear fraction
of the conditional boxes have a small Bell value for set-
tings chosen with an SV source. To obtain a min-entropy
source, we need to have that a linear fraction of the con-
ditional boxes has randomness. In this section, we es-
tablish the consequence to randomness of the observed
Bell value.
Let U denote all the settings appearing in the Bell ex-
pression. We consider first the uniform Bell value
B
U
:=
1
|U|B.{P (x|u)} =
1
|U|
∑
u,x
B(x,u)P (x|u), (35)
where |U| denotes the cardinality of U, i.e. the total
number of settings in the Bell expression (|U| = 81 for
the Bell inequality we consider). If the Bell function
B(x,u) is properly chosen, one can prove using linear
programming that ifB
U
is small, the probabilities of any
output are bounded away from 1. However, since our
inputs to each device are chosen using a SV source, we
will be only able to estimate the value of the following
expression
B
SV
=
∑
u,x
νSV (u)B(x,u)P (x|u), (36)
where νSV (u) is the distribution from an (unknown) SV
source. Let us note that the number of bits needed by
each party to choose their settings is dlog 9e = 4, so that
u is chosen using 2 dlog 9e = 8 bits. We will show that for
the Bell function, when B
SV
is small, B
U
is also small
which implies randomness (for suitably chosen δ > 0).
Lemma 2. Consider a two-party no-signaling box {P (x|u)}
satisfying
B
SV ≤ δ, (37)
for some constant δ ≥ 0, where BSV is given by Eq. (36)
with B(x,u) given by Eq. (30). Then for the particular mea-
surement setting u∗ and particular output x∗, we have
P (x = x∗|u = u∗) ≤ 1
4
(
3 +
2δ
( 12 − )8
)
. (38)
Proof. From the definition of an ε-SV source we have(
1
2
− ε
)8
≤ νSV (u) ≤
(
1
2
+ ε
)8
. (39)
so that
1
( 12 + ε)
8|U|B
SV ≤ BU ≤ 1
( 12 − ε)8|U|
B
SV
(40)
We can therefore work with the Bell value for uni-
formly chosen settings, relating it to the Bell value with
SV source settings through Eq. (40). For B
SV ≤ δ,
Eq.(40) gives that B
U ≤ δ
( 12−ε)8|U|
=: δ˜|U| .
9Consider a bipartite no-signaling box P (x|u) satisfy-
ing
B
U
:=
1
|U|B.{P (x|u)} ≤
δ˜
|U| , (41)
with B the indicator vector for the Bell expression in Eq.
(29) and |U| = 81 the number of settings in the Bell ex-
pression.
The maximum probability for the chosen output and
input for the given (uniform) Bell value can be com-
puted by the following linear program
max
{P}
: MTu∗,x∗ · {P (x|u)}
s.t. A · {P (x|u)} ≤ c. (42)
Here, the indicator vector Mu∗,x∗ is a 42 × 92 ele-
ment vector with entries Mu∗,x∗(x,u) = Iu=u∗Ix=x∗ , i.e.,
Mu∗,x∗(x,u) = 1 for (x,u) = (x∗,u∗) and 0 otherwise.
The constraint on the box {P (x|u)} written as a vector
with 42×92 entries is given by the matrix A and the vec-
tor c. These encode the no-signaling constraints between
the two parties, the normalization and the positivity
constraints on the probabilities P (x|u). In addition, A
and c also encode the condition that B.{P (x|u)} ≤ δ˜ for
a constant δ˜ ≥ 0.
The solution to the primal linear program in Eq. (42)
can be bounded by a feasible solution to the dual pro-
gram which is written as
min
λu∗,x∗
: cT · λu∗,x∗
s.t. AT · λu∗,x∗ = Mu∗,x∗ ,
λu∗,x∗ ≥ 0. (43)
We find a feasible λu∗,x∗ satisfying the constraints to the
dual program above that gives cTλu∗,x∗ ≤ 14 (3 + 2δ˜). 1
We therefore obtain by standard duality of linear pro-
gramming that
P (x = x∗|u = u∗) ≤ 1
4
(3 + 2δ˜). (44)
Noting that δ˜ = δ
( 12−ε)8
, we obtain the required bound.
uunionsq
FROM EMPIRICAL VALUES TO TRUE PARAMETERS OF
THE BOX
In this section, we state the lemmas based on the
Azuma-Hoeffding inequality and the Generalized Cher-
noff bound which we will use to estimate the arithmetic
1 The explicit vector λu∗,x∗ that is feasible for the dual program in Eq.
(43) and gives the bound can be computed by standard techniques
and is available upon request.
average of Bell values for the conditional boxes as well
as the fraction of boxes which have a lower bound. Let
us state the following Lemma 3 based on the Azuma-
Hoeffding inequality which we will use to estimate the
arithmetic average of Bell values for the conditional
boxes as well as the straightforward Lemma 4 whose
proofs can be found in [1].
Lemma 3. Consider arbitrary random variables Wi for i =
0, 1, . . . , n, and binary random variables Bi for i = 1, . . . n
that are functions of Wi, i.e. Bi = fi(Wi) for some functions
fi. Let us denote Bi = E(Bi|Wi−1, . . . ,W1,W0) for i =
1, . . . , n and (i.e. Bi are conditional means). Define for k =
1, . . . , n, the empirical average
Lk =
1
k
k∑
i=1
Bi (45)
and the arithmetic average of conditional means
Lk =
1
k
k∑
i=1
Bi. (46)
Then we have
Pr(|Ln − Ln| ≥ s) ≤ 2e−n s
2
2 (47)
Lemma 4. If the arithmetic average Ln of n conditional
means satisfies Ln ≤ δ for some parameter δ > 0, then in
at least (1−√δ)n of positions i we have Bi ≤
√
δ
Proving the lower bound for a fraction of boxes
In this section, we estimate the fraction of boxes for
which q(xi = x∗|ui = u∗,u<i, x<i, z, e) is lower bounded
by a constant. To do so, we perform a test using the
random variables Dui (x) for any fixed u
Dui (x) := D(xi,ui) =
{
1 : xi = x∗ ∧ ui = u∗
0 : otherwise
for i = 1, . . . , n. The test function is defined as
Sn(x, u) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
D(xi,ui) (48)
with the corresponding average Sn(x, u, z, e) defined as
Sn(x, u, z, e) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E∼q(xi|x<i,u,z,e)D(xi,ui). (49)
The test checks if
Sn(x, u) ≥ µ1 (50)
for a fixed µ1 > 0.
We now show that when the test accepts, with proba-
bility 1− 2 exp
(
−nµ218
)
at least µ1−2κ2(1−κ)n boxes have ran-
domness in the output for input setting u∗, specifically
that q(xi = x∗|ui = u∗,u<i, x<i, z, e) ≥ κ for fixed κ > 0.
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Lemma 5. Assume that the test given by Eq. (50)
for the box q(x1, . . . , xn|u1, . . . ,un, z, e) accepts
(for fixed µ1 > 0). Consider the set Iκ(u) :=
{i : ui = u∗ ∧ q(xi = x∗|ui = u∗,u<i, x<i, z, e) ≥ κ}.
With probability at least 1 − 2 exp
(
−nµ218
)
, |Iκ(u)| ≥
µ1−2κ
2(1−κ)n.
Proof. When the test is passed, i.e., when Sn(x, u) ≥ µ1,
by Lemma 3 with probability at least 1− 2 exp
(
−nµ218
)
,
we have that Sn(x, u, z, e) ≥ µ12 . In other words, we have∑
i
q(xi = x∗|ui = u∗,u<i, x<i, z, e) ≥ µ1
2
, (51)
where we used the no-signaling condition q(xi =
x∗|u, z, e) = q(xi = x∗|ui = u∗,u<i, x<i, z, e). Consider
the set Iκ(u), we have that
(n− |Iκ(u)|)κ+ |Iκ(u)| ≥ µ1
2
n (52)
or
|Iκ(u)| ≥ µ1 − 2κ
2(1− κ)n. (53)
Therefore, with probability at least 1 − 2 exp
(
−nµ218
)
the set of boxes with ui = u∗ and q(xi = x∗|ui =
u∗,u<i, x<i, z, e) ≥ κ for fixed µ1 > 0, 0 < κ < 12 is
of size at least µ1−2κ2(1−κ)n. uunionsq
A min-entropy source from randomness of conditional
boxes
In this section we show that if a device is such
that a linear number of conditional boxes have ran-
domness (in the weak sense that the probability of
the outputs is bounded away from one for any one
setting and this particular setting appears a linear
fraction of times), then the distribution on outputs
constitutes a min-entropy source. Let any sequence
(z, e, x1,u1, . . . , xn,un) be such that xi and ui, i ∈
{1, . . . , n}, are of the form of x = (x1, x2) and u =
(u1,u2), respectively. Consider that with large proba-
bility over sequences (z, e, x1,u1, . . . , xn,un), a particu-
lar setting u∗ appears a linear fraction µn times and that
within this fraction, the probability of x∗ and its comple-
mentary outcome x¯∗ is bounded away from 1, then the
total probability distribution is close in variational dis-
tance to a min-entropy source. To show this, we use the
following lemma from [1]
Lemma 6. Fix any measure P on the space of sequences
(z, e, x1,u1, . . . , xn,un). Suppose that for a sequence
(z, e, x1,u1, . . . , xn,un), there exists K ⊆ [n] of size larger
than µn, such that for all l ∈ K we have ul = u∗ and the
conditional boxes Px<l,u<l(xl|ul, z, e) satisfy
Px<l,u<l(xl|ul = u∗, z, e) ≤ γ. (54)
Then, P (x1, . . . , xn|u1, . . . ,un, z, e) satisfies
P (x1, . . . , xn|u1, . . . ,un, z, e) ≤ γµn. (55)
SECURITY PROOF
Let us first recall the definition of a min-entropy
source and the notion of an independent source ran-
domness extractor, specifying the extractor we will use
to obtain randomness in our protocol. The min-entropy
of a random variable S is given by
Hmin(S) = min
s∈supp(S)
log
1
P (S = s)
, (56)
where supp(S) denotes the support of S. For S ∈
{0, 1}n, the source is called an (n,Hmin(S)) min-
entropy source. An independent source extractor Ext :
({0, 1}n)k → {0, 1}m is a function that acts on k indepen-
dent min-entropy sources and outputs m bits that are
ξ close to uniform, i.e., for k independent (n,Hmin(Si))
sources (with i ∈ {1, . . . , k}) we have
‖Ext(S1, . . . , Sk)− Um‖1 ≤ ξ, (57)
where ‖.‖1 is the variational distance between the two
distributions and Um denotes the uniform distribution
on the m bits. For use in Protocol I, we use a (non-
explicit) deterministic extractor from [4] that, given two
independent sources of min-entropy larger than h, out-
puts Ω(h) bits 2−Ω(h)-close to uniform. Alternatively, in
the protocol, one might also use the explicit extractor
from [6] that, given two independent sources of min-
entropy at least logC(h) for large enough constantC out-
puts 1 bit with error h−Ω(1).
Let us define the set AzδAz1 as
AzδAz1 := {(z, u, e) :
Pr
∼q(x|z,u,e)
(
L¯n(x, u, z, e) ≥ Ln(x, u) + δAz
) ≤ Az1}
(58)
and the cut
AzδAz1 (u) := {(z, e) : (z, u, e) ∈ AzδAz1 }.
(59)
Let us also define the set Azµ12 (u) for any fixed u as
Azµ12 (u) := {(z, e) :
Pr
∼q(x|z,u,e)
(
Sn(x, u, z, e) ≤ Sn(x, u)− µ1
2
)
≤ Az2}
(60)
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with Az1 = 2e−n
1
4 δ
2
Az and Az2 = 2e−n
µ21
16 and the set
Az(u) as
Az(u) := AzδAz1 (u) ∩Azµ12 (u). (61)
Note that despite the apparent similarity in the nomen-
clature of AzδAz1 (u) and Az
µ1
2 (u), they differ in the re-
spect that Azµ12 (u) is a set of large measure for every u
(as seen in Eq. (64)) while AzδAz1 (u) is a set of large mea-
sure only for most (typical) u. Here
Ln(x, u) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
B(xi,ui),
L¯n(x, u, z, e) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Eq(xi,ui|x<i,u<i,z,e)B(xi,ui).(62)
Similarly,
Sn(x, u) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
D(xi,ui),
Sn(x, u, z, e) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Eq(xi,|x<i,u,z,e)D(xi,ui). (63)
Applying Lemma 3, taking W0 = (z, e), Wi = (xi,ui)
for i = 1, . . . , n, we obtain by a direct application of the
Markov inequality that∑
(z,u,e)∈AzδAz1
q(z, u, e) ≥ 1− Az1
∑
(z,e)∈Azµ12 (u)
q(z, e|u) ≥ 1− Az2. (64)
To elaborate, we get from Lemma 3 that
Pr
(x,u,z,e)∼q(x,u,z,e)
(
L¯n(x, u, z, e) ≥ Ln(x, u) + δAz
) ≤ 2Az1
Pr
(z,u,e)∼q(z,u,e)
[ Pr
x∼q(x|z,u,e)
(
L¯n(x, u, z, e) ≥ Ln(x, u) + δAz
)
≥ Az1] ≤ Az1 (65)
and the second inequality in Eq.(64) is obtained simi-
larly.
Also, as stated previously we define the sets ACC1
and ACC2 as the sets of (x, u) for which the tests in the
protocol are passed, i.e.,
ACC1 := {(x, u) : Ln(x, u) ≤ δ}
ACC2 := {(x, u) : Sn(x, u) ≥ µ1} , (66)
and the set ACC = ACC1 ∩ ACC2 of (x, u) for which
both tests in the protocol are passed. Let us also define
ACCu := {x : (x, u) ∈ ACC}. (67)
We are now ready to formulate the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Consider the measure q(x, z, u, t, e) satisfying
Eq.(28). For constant δ1 > 0, we have that
Pr
∼q(z,u,e|ACC)
(
max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC) ≤
√
δ1
q(ACC)
)
≥ 1−
√
δ1
q(ACC)
. (68)
Proof. Let us write
∑
z,u,e
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC)
=
∑
(z,u,e)/∈AzδAz1
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC)
+
∑
(z,u,e)∈AzδAz1
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC).
(69)
and bound the two terms separately. The first term can
be simply bounded as
∑
(z,u,e)/∈AzδAz1
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC)
maxx q(x|z,u,e,ACC)≤1≤
∑
(z,u,e)/∈AzδAz1
q(z, u, e|ACC)
q(z,u,e,ACC)≤q(z,u,e)
≤
∑
(z,u,e)/∈AzδAz1
q(z, u, e)
q(ACC)
Eq.(64)
≤
∑
u
Az1
q(ACC)
. (70)
For the second term, with (z, u, e) ∈ AzδAz1 , we have
that for fixed u, (z, e) ∈ AzδAz1 (u). We therefore split the
second term as
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∑
(z,u,e)∈AzδAz1
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC)
=
∑
u
(z,e)∈AzδAz1 (u)∩Az
µ1
2 (u)
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC) +
∑
u
(z,e)∈AzδAz1 (u)∩(Az
µ1
2 (u))
c
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC),
(71)
where (Azµ12 (u))
c denotes the complement of the set
Azµ12 (u). Let us first consider the case when (z, e) ∈
AzδAz1 (u) ∩ Azµ12 (u), i.e., (z, e) ∈ Az(u). We define the
sets
X
(z,u,e)
g1 = {x : L¯n(x, u, z, e) ≤ Ln(x, u) + δAz},
X
(z,u,e)
g2 = {x : Sn(x, u, z, e) ≥ Sn(x, u)−
µ1
2
},
(72)
and the complements
(
X
(z,u,e)
g1
)c
,
(
X
(z,u,e)
g2
)c
.
By the definition of AzδAz1 (u), for (z, e) ∈ AzδAz1 (u)
and x ∈
(
X
(z,u,e)
g1
)c
, we have
q(x|z, u, e) ≤ Az1 (73)
for Az1 = 2e−n
1
4 δ
2
Az . Similarly, by the definition of
Azµ12 (u), for (z, e) ∈ Azµ12 (u) and x ∈
(
X
(z,u,e)
g2
)c
, we
have
q(x|z, u, e) ≤ Az2 (74)
for Az2 = 2e−n
µ21
16 . Therefore, for (z, e) ∈ Az(u) and
x ∈
(
X
(z,u,e)
g1 ∩X(z,u,e)g2
)c
∩ACCu, we have that
q(x|z, u, e) ≤ Az1 + Az2. (75)
Now let us look at the case when (z, e) ∈ Az(u) and
x ∈
(
X
(z,u,e)
g1 ∩X(z,u,e)g2
)
∩ ACCu. By the definition of
ACC1, we have Ln(x, u) ≤ δ, and by the definition of
X
(z,u,e)
g1 we have that
L¯n(x, u, z, e) ≤ δ + δAz. (76)
By Lemma 4, for at least µ2n positions i where µ2 = 1−√
δ + δAz , there is
Eq(xi,ui|x<i,u<i,z,e)B(xi,ui) ≤
√
δ + δAz =
√
2δ, (77)
where we have simply set δAz = δ for constant δ > 0.
Therefore, by Lemma 2, at these µ2n positions i, we have
that for the particular input and output pair ui = u∗ and
xi = x∗
qx<i,u<i,z,e(xi = x
∗|ui = u∗) ≤ 1
4
(
3 +
2
√
2δ
( 12 − )8
)
. (78)
Note that we will choose δ such that
1
4
(
3 +
2
√
2δ
( 12 − )8
)
< 1
i.e., 0 < δ <
( 12 − ε)16
8
(79)
to have the above probability bounded below unity.
Similarly, by the definition of ACC2, Sn(x, u) ≥ µ1, and
by the definition of X(z,u,e)g2 , we have that
Sn(x, u, z, e) ≥ µ1
2
. (80)
By Lemma 5, for at least µ3n positions i, where µ3 =
µ1−2κ
2(1−κ) for fixed κ > 0, we have
qx<i,u<i,z,e(xi = x
∗|ui = u∗) ≥ κ. (81)
Therefore, for (z, e) ∈ Az(u) and x ∈(
X
(z,u,e)
g1 ∩X(z,u,e)g2
)
∩ ACCu, we have that there
are at least µ4n positions i with µ4 = (µ3 + µ2 − 1) for
which
qx<i,u<i,z,e(xi|ui = u∗) ≤ γ (82)
for xi = x∗ as well as xi 6= x∗. Here,
γ = max
{
(1− κ) , 1
4
(
3 +
2
√
2δ
( 12 − )8
)}
. (83)
In order to have µ4 > 0, i.e., µ3 + µ2 > 1 we will choose
constant δ > 0 such that
µ1 − 2κ
2(1− κ) −
√
2δ > 0,
i.e., δ <
1
2
[
µ1 − 2κ
2(1− κ)
]2
. (84)
Combining Eq. (79) and Eq.(84) we have that
δ < min
{
( 12 − ε)16
8
,
1
2
[
µ1 − 2κ
2(1− κ)
]2}
(85)
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Therefore, for any (z, e) ∈ Az(u) and x ∈ ACCu, com-
bining Eq. (75) and Eq.(82) we have from Lemma 6 that
max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC) = maxx∈ACCu q(x|z, u, e)
q(ACC|z, u, e)
≤ max{Az1 + Az2, γ
µ4n}
q(ACC|z, u, e) .
(86)
From the above considerations, we can bound∑
u
(z,e)∈Az(u)
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC)
Eq. (86)
≤
∑
u
(z,e)∈Az(u)
q(z, u, e|ACC)max{Az1 + Az2, γ
µ4n}
q(ACC|z, u, e)
≤ max{Az1 + Az2, γµ4n}
∑
(z,u,e)
q(z, u, e)
q(ACC)
≤ max{Az1 + Az2, γ
µ4n}
q(ACC)
. (87)
We can also simply bound
∑
u
(z,e)∈AzδAz1 (u)∩(Az
µ1
2 (u))
c
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC)
≤
∑
u
(z,e)∈AzδAz1 (u)∩(Az
µ1
2 (u))
c
q(z, u, e|ACC)
q(z,u,e,ACC)≤q(z,u,e)
≤
∑
u
(z,e)∈(Azµ12 (u))
c
q(u)q(z, e|u)
q(ACC)
Eq.(64)
≤ Az2
q(ACC)
. (88)
Inserting the bounds from Eqs. (87) and (88) into Eq.(71)
gives
∑
(z,u,e)∈AzδAz1
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC)
≤ Az1 + 2Az2 + γ
µ4n
q(ACC)
(89)
Finally, inserting the bounds from Eqs.(70) and (89) into
Eq. (69) gives
∑
(z,u,e)
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC)
≤ 2(Az1 + Az2) + γ
µ4n
q(ACC)
(90)
Applying Markov inequality, setting δ1 = 2(Az1 +
Az2) + γ
µ4n, we get that
Pr
∼q(z,u,e|ACC)
(
max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC) ≤
√
δ1
q(ACC)
)
≥ 1−
√
δ1
q(ACC)
. (91)
This completes the proof. uunionsq
We now note the following lemma which follows
from the assumptions stated in the text (for a proof see
[1])
Lemma 8. For any probability distribution q(x, z, u, t, e)
satisfying Eq.(28) it holds that
q(x|z, u, t, e, ACC) = q(x|z, u,ACC). (92)
We use Lemma 8 along with Lemma 7 to obtain the
following theorem whose proof follows a similar state-
ment in [1] showing that either the tests in the proto-
col are passed with vanishing probability or we obtain
Ω(n1/4) (|S| = 2Ω(n1/4)) secure random bits.
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Theorem 9. Let n denote the number of runs in Protocol I
and suppose we are given  > 0. For fixed µ1 > 0, 0 < κ <
µ1
2 , set δ > 0 such that
δ < min
{
( 12 − ε)16
8
,
1
2
[
µ1 − 2κ
2(1− κ)
]2
.
}
(93)
Then for any probability distribution pw(x, z, u, t, e) satisfy-
ing Eqs. (18)-(23) there exists a non-explicit extractor s(x, t)
with |S| = 2Ω(n1/4) values, such that
dc · p(ACC) ≤ 2−Ω(n1/4), (94)
where dc is given by (24) as
dc :=
∑
s,e
max
w
∑
z
∣∣∣∣p(s, z, e|w,ACC)− 1|S|p(z, e|w,ACC)
∣∣∣∣ .
(95)
Alternatively, one can use an explicit extractor s′(x, t) pro-
ducing a single bit of randomness with
dc · p(ACC) ≤ 2−Ω(n1/(2C)), (96)
for some constant C.
PASSING THE TESTS WITH QUANTUM BOXES
Finally, we check that for suitable parameters δ and
µ1 both tests in the protocol are passed with the use of
good quantum boxes by the honest parties.
Generalized Chernoff bound for Santha-Vazirani sources
The final part of the proof is to show that if the honest
parties use good quantum boxes, the tests in the proto-
col are passed with high probability. We first show that
the Santha-Vazirani source satisfies an exponential con-
centration property given by the following generalized
Chernoff bound, which will imply that the second test
in the protocol is feasible, i.e., that in a linear fraction of
the runs the setting u∗ appears.
Theorem 10. (Generalized Chernoff bound)[7, 8] Let Xi
for i ∈ [n] be Boolean random variables such that for some
0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1, we have that, for every subset S ⊆ [n]
Pr [∧i∈SXi = 1] ≤ ζ |S|. Then, for any 0 ≤ ζ ≤ γ ≤ 1
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Xi ≥ γn
]
≤ e−nD(γ||ζ), (97)
where D(·||·) is the relative entropy function. In particular
D(γ||ζ) ≥ 2(γ − ζ)2.
We show now that the SV source satisfies the assump-
tion of the above theorem, i.e., that probability of not
obtaining the input u∗ in a subset of size k is upper
bounded by ζk for ζ =
[
1− ( 12 − )2m] with 2m being
the number of bits the two parties need to choose a sin-
gle u (2m = 2 dlog 9e = 8 for the Bell inequality we con-
sider).
Lemma 11. For any non-empty subset of k indices
(i1, ..., ik) ⊆ [n], and n consecutive instances of random vari-
able U chosen according to measure ν using 2mn bits from
an -SV source (where 2m is the number of bits required to
choose a single instance u), for any fixed u∗ in the range of U ,
we have
Pr∼ν(ui1 6= u∗, . . . ,uik 6= u∗) ≤
[
1−
(
1
2
− 
)2m]k
(98)
Proof. Let us assume, w.l.o.g. that ik ≥ ik−1 ≥ ... ≥ i1.
We have
Pr∼ν(ui1 6= u
∗, . . . ,uik 6= u∗)
=
∑
{uij }:ij /∈{i1,...,ik}
Pr∼ν(u1, . . . ,ui1 6= u
∗, . . . ,uik 6= u∗, . . . ,un)
=
∑
{uij }:ij /∈{i1,...,ik}
Pr∼ν(u1) Pr∼ν(ui1 6= u
∗|u1, . . . ,ui1−1) . . .Pr∼ν(uik 6= u
∗|u1, . . . ,uik−1) . . .Pr∼ν(un|u1, . . . ,un−1)
≤
[
1−
(
1
2
− 
)2m]k
(99)
The last inequality is obtained by noting that for terms with ij ∈ {i1, . . . , ik}, by the definition of the SV source
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P (uij 6= u∗|u1, . . . ,uij−1) ≤
[
1− ( 12 − )2m] with 2m
being the number of bits required to obtain any input u,
and for the terms with ij /∈ {i1, . . . , ik}, the sum over uij
gives unity by normalization. uunionsq
Consider the random variable Xi defined as
Xi :=
{
1 : ui 6= u∗
0 : otherwise
for ui chosen using the SV source ν(·). Theorem 10 to-
gether with Lemma 11 gives that
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Xi ≥ γn
]
≤ e−2n(γ−ζ)2 , (100)
or equivalently
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Xi < γn
]
≥ 1− e−2n(γ−ζ)2 , (101)
for ζ =
[
1− ( 12 − )2m] and 0 ≤ ζ ≤ γ ≤ 1. For U˜(u) :=
{i : ui = u∗} and Ch := {u : |U˜(u)| ≥ µ5n} for some
constant µ5 > 0, Eq. (101) gives that∑
u∈Ch
ν(u) ≥ 1− e−2n(1−µ5−ζ)2 . (102)
Therefore, we obtain that with probability 1 −
e−2n(1−µ5−ζ)
2
, ui = u∗ for a fraction µ5 of the n runs.
We note that with the use of the state and measurements
from Eqs.(31), (32) and (33), we obtain a box {Pq(x|u)}
that achieves maximal violation of the Bell inequality,
i.e., B.{Pq(x|u)} = 0 and also has Pq(x = x∗|u = u∗) =
1
16 . Therefore, for suitably chosen δ, µ1 > 0 the two tests
in the protocol are passed with high probability with the
use of good quantum boxes.
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